Research report “Perspectives on Implementing the Comprehensive Defence Concept at the Local Level: A Case Study of 1325 National Action Plan Localisation”
The study examines how the specifics of Ukrainian lawmaking and the practices of regulatory implementation impact achieving state policy goals. The subject of the analysis is the National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security for the period until 2025. Based on this, the study outlines the prospects for developing and implementing a Ukrainian counterpart to the Swedish Comprehensive Defence concept. Ensuring collective resilience during crises requires a formal legal framework and cooperation within the “government–civil society–business” triad; therefore, the constraints and enablers identified in this report regarding the current policy document will be instrumental in building a comprehensive defence system.
Keywords: comprehensive defence; lawmaking; Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda; state program; local self-government bodies; 1325 coalition.
CONTENTS
RESEARCH TEAM CONTENTS ACRONYMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION Methodology Research Context THE REALITIES OF DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND STATE PROGRAMS: THE CASE OF NAP 1325 ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY Initiation and Preparation Development and Approval Implementation Oversight, Monitoring, and Evaluation CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES APPENDICES Appendix A. The Cycle of Legislative Adoption and Implementation in Ukraine Appendix B. The Development and Implementation Cycle of State Policy Documents Appendix C. Case Study: The 1325 Zakarpattiya Coalition and Budget Allocation for the Regional 1325 Action Plan
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study is dedicated to assessing the capacity to develop and implement cross-cutting inter-agency programming documents (using NAP 1325 Women, Peace, and Security as a case study) within the framework of the Comprehensive Defence concept. The objective of the study is to identify constraints and successful implementation practices of such documents, to examine the decision-making system within government authorities, and to explore the role of the local level.
Overall, the study confirmed that prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had made significant progress in the field of gender equality. At the same time, numerous barriers to program implementation at the local level were identified. For instance, the analysis shows that state policies (including NAP 1325) encounter obstacles during their implementation at the local level. The study also established the critical role of funding: programs with clearly allocated resources have a higher chance of effective implementation, whereas a lack of funding leads to a formalistic approach. These generalized findings have defined the primary thematic areas (local barriers, the role of resources, and engagement with civil society) for further in-depth analysis.
The study encompasses the following key areas:
Legislative and conceptual foundations, including an analysis of Sweden’s Comprehensive Defence concept (objectives, priorities, and coordination bodies) and a comparison with Ukrainian strategies. Specifically, the study examines how Ukraine’s National Security Strategy articulates societal involvement in defence and how NAP 1325 complements this approach by seeking to ensure the equal participation of women and men in security and conflict response.
The development and approval process of NAP 1325. The study highlights the history of the initiative (the role of women’s CSOs and international organisations), the selection of the coordinating body, and an analysis of the drafting and reconciliation process (specifically, donor involvement and the availability of data and indicators).
Engagement of stakeholders from civil society, local authorities, the private sector, and the security and defence sector in the development and implementation of the document. The study examines communication channels between CSOs, local self-government bodies (LSGs), the central government, and the community, as well as the role of the Ukrainian-Swedish experience in networking and building coalitions (e.g., the “1325 Zakarpattia” Coalition). It was established that, in practice, community engagement remains limited. Established practice relies on a “top-down” approach to task-setting, characterized by a lack of teamwork oriented toward socially beneficial outcomes; a formalistic approach dominates the implementation of NAP 1325 at the local level.
Plan Localization and Implementation. The study describes the key stages: the development of Regional Action Plans (which was mandatory for all regions) and implementation at the community level (carried out on a voluntary basis). Specifically, the analysis reveals that Regional Action Plans (RAPs) 1325 were frequently developed without genuine adaptation to regional specificities. Numerous barriers to the implementation of RAPs 1325 were identified: bureaucracy (centralized management), local staffing shortages, a lack of strategic planning within communities, inter-departmental coordination issues, funding deficits, overlapping functions between programs, and weak communication.
A focus on vulnerable groups and gender. The study places increased emphasis on the target groups of NAP 1325 (including women, IDPs, veterans, and others). It was established that while addressing these groups is the primary goal of NAP 1325, local implementation is often reduced to formal activities and remains constrained by insufficient planning and funding.
The Role of Finance and Resources. The study evaluates the impact of budgetary provision on implementation effectiveness. In particular, experts noted that earmarked funding for NAP 1325 activities (at either the national or local level) significantly increases the probability of their successful implementation.
Swedish Experience: Lessons for Ukraine. The study compares Ukrainian practices with the Swedish experience (specifically regarding gender equality trajectories and the roles of non-governmental organisations in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325).
The analysis of the study results provides a basis for the following general conclusions. Firstly, state policies such as NAP 1325 face numerous barriers when implemented at the local level. It is precisely local factors — such as a lack of resources, bureaucratic hurdles, and low motivation among implementers — that create the greatest difficulties for program execution. Secondly, the study confirms that the availability of budget funds significantly enhances the quality of plan implementation: policy documents with clearly defined funding have substantially higher chances of success than those left unfunded. Thirdly, the involvement of civil society organisations (particularly women’s groups) can partially offset resource constraints and facilitate the implementation of inter-agency documents. In practice, however, local authorities often view cooperation with CSOs as an additional burden rather than a collaborative solution.
Finally, the study demonstrated that the traditional administrative culture within state and local government bodies — inherited from Soviet-era approaches — complicates the implementation of cross-cutting strategies. In conclusion, gender mainstreaming and its related initiatives (such as NAP 1325) continue to be treated as low-priority issues.
Thus, the study demonstrates that for the successful localisation of the Comprehensive Defence concept through a gender-responsive lens, it is essential to strengthen financial and human resources, foster inter-agency cooperation, actively engage communities and the private sector in practical implementation, and elevate the priority of gender issues within the security system.
The research was conducted by the CSO “Expert Resource Gender in Detail” as part of the project “Gender Mainstreaming in the Context of Comprehensive Defence”, funded by the grant “Best Practices of the Swedish Gender Approach as a Tool for Empowering Ukrainian Women to Implement Sustainable Reforms and Promote Ukraine’s European Integration”, with financial support from the Swedish Institute and in partnership with the Swedish International Liberal Centre.
The project draws on gender mainstreaming practices within Sweden’s comprehensive defence system and represents the first attempt in the Ukrainian context to explore the possibilities of implementing a Swedish-style comprehensive defence strategy in Ukraine while simultaneously integrating a gender perspective across key sectors, including the economy, care work, the armed forces, civil defence, governance, information policy, and the volunteer movement.
The project’s concept author and project lead is Tamara Zlobina, PhD in Philosophy and Head of the CSO “Expert Resource Gender in Detail”.
Project mentors and reviewers of the analytical reports: Olena Strelnyk, Doctor of Sociological Sciences Hanna Hrytsenko, Gender Expert
This study analyzes the role and readiness of women in the civil defense system of Ukraine and the possibilities of institutionally strengthening their contribution through the adaptation of international experience, in particular the Swedish model of comprehensive defense. The methodology combines quantitative data from a nationally representative survey and qualitative interviews, supplemented by an analysis of regulatory documents and data from open sources. The focus of the work is the interaction of state bodies and civil society, the development of volunteer initiatives and training programs, as well as gender-sensitive aspects of crisis preparedness. The study offers recommendations for integrating the practical experience of volunteer initiatives and training programs into systemic mechanisms for training citizens. The expected impact of these recommendations is also considered at four levels: individual, local, institutional and national. Practical implications relate to the formation of a systemic approach to training citizens and the development of resource mobilization mechanisms. The results emphasize the importance of integrating women into civil defense as a component of a sustainable and flexible security and defense system of Ukraine.
Keywords: women and security, civil defense, comprehensive defense, national resistance, Ukrainian-Swedish cooperation.
CONTENTS
BRIEF SUMMARY INTRODUCTION METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL DEFENSE 1.1 Why Does Ukraine Need Total Defense? 1.2 Summary of Chapter 1 CHAPTER 2. THE CIVIL DEFENSE SYSTEM IN SWEDEN Summary of Chapter 2 CHAPTER 3. SVENSKA LOTTAKÅREN: SWEDEN’S AUXILIARY WOMEN’S DEFENCE CORPS 3.1 Case Study Analysis: Legal Framework, Functions, Responsibilities, and Organizational Programs 3.2 An overview of the organization’s training courses and identification of those adaptable to the Ukrainian context. 3.3 Summary of Chapter 3 CHAPTER 4. UKRAINE: FROM CIVIL PROTECTION TO TOTAL DEFENSE 4.1 Legislative Foundations and the Transformation of Civil Protection into Total Defense 4.2 Implementing Total Defense Principles in Practice CHAPTER 5. WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP IN CIVIL READINESS AS A COMPONENT OF TOTAL DEFENSE 5.1 Social Motivations and Challenges to Women’s Participation in the Civil Readiness System 5.2 Women’s Grassroots Initiatives in Civil Readiness: From Ad Hoc Practices to Systemic Models 5.3 Summary of Chapter 5 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 6.1. PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SWEDISH SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE CIVIL DEFENSE SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 6.3. POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIOS: From Pilot Projects to Institutionalization The Most Realistic Scenario: Piloting and Incremental Scaling Contingency Scenario: A Civil Society Initiative 6.4. EXPECTED IMPACT of Recommendations Across Four Levels CONCLUSIONS REFERENCE Appendix A. National Survey Structure
BRIEF SUMMARY
This report examines the readiness of Ukrainian society to participate in civil defense and provides recommendations for the institutional and civic development of the system, particularly focusing on the gender dimension and the role of women in strengthening community resilience.
In the Ukrainian context, civil defense is still undergoing transformation: from a centralized model of state paternalism to a partnership-based total defense model, where all citizens actively contribute to the security and resilience of their communities. The high potential of Ukrainian civil society has already been demonstrated during the war through numerous volunteer and educational initiatives, which effectively implement total defense principles from the bottom up, mirroring the Swedish total defense model.
The study examines the current state of Ukrainian civil society’s preparedness for civil defense during the full-scale war. The results of a representative survey show that only 14.7% of citizens have undergone civil defense training since the outbreak of the war. At the same time, 43% of respondents believe that civilians should actively participate in emergency response, while 48% are ready to join after receiving appropriate training. These data demonstrate a high level of civic motivation, which, as the study shows, requires formalization and systematization through structured training and support programs.
Based on these results, the study proposes concrete steps to improve Ukraine’s civil defense system. Firstly, it is recommended to integrate civil security courses into existing programs of Centers for National Resistance Training, non-governmental organizations, and the State Emergency Service (SES). Special emphasis is placed on crisis response, evacuation, debris clearance, and other practical skills that enhance community readiness.
Secondly, the study highlights the need to establish a certification system and regular retraining for male and female volunteers. This will not only ensure that knowledge remains up-to-date but also strengthen the trust of communities and state authorities in the individuals involved.
The importance of institutionalizing women’s initiatives and civil society organizations was further emphasized. Supporting networks of women trainers and leaders in civil preparedness will facilitate gender mainstreaming in security policy, address women’s needs, strengthen social resilience, and foster the development of horizontal networks of trust.
The study also proposes a decentralized governance structure capable of responding swiftly to regional needs and integrating state programs, local communities, and civil society organizations. A study of the Swedish experience suggests that adapting the ‘Lottakåren’ model to Ukrainian realities will transform ‘enthusiastic chaos’ into an institutional pillar of total defense. The Ukrainian model, as emphasized in the study, should be built on the principles of equality, civic engagement, local resilience, and trust between the state and the community.
Overall, such an approach not only ensures security but also fosters a new culture of civic responsibility, where every citizen — regardless of gender — becomes an active participant in national defense.
The research was conducted by the CSO “Expert Resource Gender in Detail” as part of the project “Gender Mainstreaming in the Context of Comprehensive Defence”, funded by the grant “Best Practices of the Swedish Gender Approach as a Tool for Empowering Ukrainian Women to Implement Sustainable Reforms and Promote Ukraine’s European Integration”, with financial support from the Swedish Institute and in partnership with the Swedish International Liberal Centre.
The project draws on gender mainstreaming practices within Sweden’s comprehensive defence system and represents the first attempt in the Ukrainian context to explore the possibilities of implementing a Swedish-style comprehensive defence strategy in Ukraine while simultaneously integrating a gender perspective across key sectors, including the economy, care work, the armed forces, civil defence, governance, information policy, and the volunteer movement.
The project’s concept author and project lead is Tamara Zlobina, PhD in Philosophy and Head of the CSO “Expert Resource Gender in Detail”.
Project mentors and reviewers of the analytical reports: Olena Strelnyk, Doctor of Sociological Sciences Hanna Hrytsenko, Gender Expert
This study analyses the vital role and impact of the grassroots volunteering movement in Ukraine within the context of Russia’s ongoing armed aggression. It provides an overview of volunteering dynamics and the legal framework, combining quantitative and qualitative data to examine organisational forms, grassroots characteristics, and cooperation with authorities and the NGO sector. The research explores gender aspects and future prospects of grassroots efforts, including case studies of families of POWs, missing persons, and civilian hostages. It concludes with recommendations for key stakeholders on strengthening the movement for Ukraine’s comprehensive defence.
Keywords: volunteer movement, grassroots volunteering, volunteer initiatives, activism, individual volunteers, comprehensive defence, Russia’s war against Ukraine, Ukraine.
ABSTRACT
ACRONYMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT: LEGAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1.1 Brief Overview and Analysis of the Legal Framework 1.2 Overview of Public Engagement in Volunteering and the Dynamics of the Volunteer Movement, Specifically Post-2022 1.3 Results of the Nationwide Survey on Volunteering Engagement in 2025 1.4 Summary of Section 1 CHAPTER 2. ORGANISATIONAL FORMS OF THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT 2.1 Typology of Volunteering: Legal Status and Areas of Activity 2.2 Challenges in Categorising Volunteering 2.3 Summary of Section 2 CHAPTER 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF GRASSROOTS VOLUNTEERING IN UKRAINE 3.1 Summary of Section 3 CHAPTER 4. INTERACTION WITH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, BUSINESS, AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR 4.1 Summary of Chapter 4 CHAPTER 5. GENDER ASPECTS OF VOLUNTEERING 5.1 Summary of Chapter 5 CHAPTER 6. THE DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE OF GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 6.1 Summary of Chapter 6 CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDIES: ASSOCIATIONS OF FAMILIES OF POWs, MISSING PERSONS, AND CIVILIAN HOSTAGES 7.1 Summary of Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“Until 2014, volunteers were perceived by society as some kind of freaks who had nothing better to do and were just making things up. After 2014, it became a trend, a mark of good manners. And after 2022, this trend intensified: the formula ‘you are either in the AFU or for the AFU’ became the truth. Therefore, every man and woman must make their contribution to victory.” Individual female volunteer, Interview 15
This study aims to outline how the grassroots volunteer movement complements and sustains Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
Context. In 2025, during the twelfth year of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the fourth year of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s grassroots volunteer movement continues to operate and evolve. In 2024, the share of the employed population involved in volunteer or charitable activities (at least once a month) was 57.7% for women and 54.4% for men. Volunteer initiatives operate across all spheres of society: from fundraising for diverse military and humanitarian needs to non-financial assistance to the Defence Forces, war victims, internally displaced persons (IDPs), veterans, and people in difficult life circumstances, as well as services in education, culture, environmental protection, and beyond. An active volunteer movement fosters greater resilience within Ukrainian society.
The research methodology is based on a mixed-methods approach, combining desk and field research. The latter involved both quantitative (a survey of 1,000 respondents via CATI based on random digit dialling) and qualitative (16 in-depth interviews) methods, partially conducted in parallel. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) and case studies were employed as supplementary methods.
Chapter 1. Overview of the Volunteer Movement: Legal and Temporal Perspectives.
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the development of the volunteer movement in Ukraine through the prism of legal regulation and socio-historical transformations. Desk research findings indicate the gradual establishment of a volunteering culture in Ukraine: from episodic initiatives in the early 1990s to a large-scale movement integrated into various spheres today, from supporting the military to humanitarian aid during the full-scale invasion.
The legal analysis of the legislative framework underscored the importance of a clear distinction between the concepts of “volunteer” and “benefactor,” and identified the key regulatory changes that influenced the organisation and regulation of volunteer activities. Changes in the institutional structure of volunteer coordination, social guarantees for volunteers, and the legal challenges currently faced by male and female volunteers are examined separately.
The study analysed the dynamics of public engagement in volunteering, along with the results of sociological and academic research highlighting the transformation of the volunteer movement in Ukraine in recent years. Findings from the 2025 nationwide survey conducted as part of this study demonstrate steady public involvement: 41% of respondents are actively participating in volunteer initiatives, showing a relative gender balance.
Chapter 2. Forms of Organizing the Volunteer Movement.
This chapter presents various forms of volunteer organisation in Ukraine, classified based on empirical data by their legal status and spheres of activity. The primary functions of each form are analysed, and the intersections and distinctions between volunteer work and activism are explored. The overview demonstrates the diversity of the volunteer environment and reveals the specifics of its structuring and categorisation.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of Grassroots Volunteering in Ukraine.
Data from in-depth interviews provided an analysis of the specific features of grassroots volunteering in Ukraine, its horizontal structure, and social responsibility. The chapter examines the experiences of individual volunteers and volunteer initiative groups, both those formalised as civil society or charitable organisations and those remaining informal.
Chapter 4. Interaction with Authorities, Business, and the Civil Sector.
Volunteer initiatives that emerged as a response to the urgent challenges of war are gradually forming a powerful parallel system capable of performing functions traditionally belonging to the state. In-depth interview data indicate that the grassroots volunteer movement is open to cooperation with authorities, businesses, and non-profits, seeking ways to establish contacts despite perceived barriers. This chapter outlines the extent to which volunteer initiatives substitute for state functions and raises questions about the future interaction between civil society and the state.
Chapter 5. Gender Aspects of Volunteering.
This chapter examines gender dimensions and representations within Ukraine’s grassroots volunteerism. The analysis shows how the movement reflects, reproduces, and transforms traditional gender roles, influencing motivation, the nature of activities, and the division of labour. By utilising both quantitative survey data and qualitative testimonies from male and female volunteers, the study traces gender differences in tasks and sectors of involvement. Special attention is paid to the visibility of female leadership and its reflection in everyday practices and the public sphere, where gender asymmetry remains more pronounced.
Chapter 6. Development and the Future of Grassroots Movements.
This chapter analyses the evolution of Ukrainian grassroots volunteer initiatives amidst a protracted war, highlighting their needs and challenges during formalisation and professionalisation. It examines trends in the institutionalisation of volunteer hubs, reasons for maintaining the informal nature of certain initiatives, and the movement’s adaptation to emerging social needs. Based on quantitative and qualitative data, the study traces how activists redefine development strategies, strengthen horizontal ties, and enhance community resilience.
Chapter 7. Case Studies of Associations of Families of Prisoners of War, Missing Persons, and Civil Hostages.
This chapter outlines the development, characteristics, and needs of the civic movement formed by families of prisoners of war (POWs), missing persons, and civilian hostages, which has expanded rapidly in response to Russia’s aggression. It presents case study findings, analysing the composition of these associations, their geography, activities, and challenges, as well as their interaction with local authorities, government bodies, and international organisations. The focus is on civic activism and volunteer efforts aimed at advocating for the rights of victims and providing pro bono assistance to families.
Conclusions. The study summarises its key findings: the strength of the volunteer community, the fluid nature of categorisation, legal uncertainty, resource resilience, and issues of gender representation.
Recommendations. Recommendations are provided for key stakeholders on how to maintain sustainability and strengthen the grassroots volunteer movement for comprehensive defence.
The research was conducted by the CSO “Expert Resource Gender in Detail” as part of the project “Gender Mainstreaming in the Context of Comprehensive Defence”, funded by the grant “Best Practices of the Swedish Gender Approach as a Tool for Empowering Ukrainian Women to Implement Sustainable Reforms and Promote Ukraine’s European Integration”, with financial support from the Swedish Institute and in partnership with the Swedish International Liberal Centre.
The project draws on gender mainstreaming practices within Sweden’s comprehensive defence system and represents the first attempt in the Ukrainian context to explore the possibilities of implementing a Swedish-style comprehensive defence strategy in Ukraine while simultaneously integrating a gender perspective across key sectors, including the economy, care work, the armed forces, civil defence, governance, information policy, and the volunteer movement.
The project’s concept author and project lead is Tamara Zlobina, PhD in Philosophy and Head of the CSO “Expert Resource Gender in Detail”.
Project mentors and reviewers of the analytical reports: Olena Strelnyk, Doctor of Sociological Sciences Hanna Hrytsenko, Gender Expert
Who is Lucrezia? Lucrezia di Cosimo de’ Medici (February 14, 1545 – April 21, 1561) was the third daughter and fifth of eleven children of Cosimo I de’ Medici, Duke of Florence, and the Spanish aristocrat Eleanor of Toledo (Lady Whistledown would have definitely rated “the most prolific family in the upper echelons of society”).
The duchess made sure that her children received the best education: when teachers come to your palazzo, you can’t skip “school”, so all the Medici children were enrolled in science, whether they were boys or girls.
But what’s the point of educating a girl if you can’t demonstrate your knowledge to your husband?
So in 1552, Lucrezia was engaged to Pope Julius III’s nephew, Fabio Dal Monte, but the engagement had to be called off three years later due to the Pope’s death. It seems like we can breathe a little, but will it get better?
In 1557, after the death of her older sister Maria de’ Medici, Lucrezia takes her place as the bride of the future Duke of Ferrara, Alfonso II d’Este. Her dowry was 200,000 scudi – a huge sum by the standards of that time. With this money, three Palazzo Pitti could have been built and there was still enough left for pins and lace. But what is money worth if even the best doctors were powerless and could not prevent Lucrezia’s death from tuberculosis in 1560? The sixteen-year-old girl was buried in the monastery of the Corpus Christi in Ferrara, but after her death, rumors circulated for a long time that the young wife was poisoned by her own husband.
And what about the book? The author took care to ensure that Lucrezia’s life on the pages of her novel was authentic: she allows only a number of factual inaccuracies, justified sometimes by design, sometimes out of concern for the reader, so as not to confuse him with names and statuses. Thus, the line of relations of Alfonso II d’Este’s sister Elisabetta (in reality also Lucrezia) is shifted in time by 14 years and became an important and vivid episode of the story.
Lucrezia de’ Medici was indeed an educated and intelligent girl, but we know nothing about her keen hearing, clumsiness in dancing, or talent for drawing. These are details added by the author to make the character’s image more voluminous.
Why a tigress? In the Palazzo Vecchio of Cosimo I Medici there was a menagerie with exotic animals, among which were majestic tigers, but information about whether the children of the Duke of Tuscany were allowed there, if they were, has not been preserved.
It is worth noting that the parallel drawn by the author transforms the usual expression “like a bird in a cage”: the girl is no longer seen as a poor helpless bird. She is a tigress. Strong, powerful, with extremely great potential, with energy and abilities that are capable of conquering the world if they are recognized and not neglected.
The theme of suppression of inner strength, abilities and self-realization becomes one of the key ones in the novel.
Did Lucretia have the opportunity and right to be happy?
Few people were concerned about women’s happiness in the 16th century, because if you are a woman, your function is reduced to the role of “wife” and “mother”. Lucretia was expected to be submissive, modest, and to follow moral standards. She was to become an electron that revolved around her husband, without the right to exist in a world separate from him.
Lucretia had no chance of becoming free in a society where you were taught music and art only to entertain your husband. What kind of happiness could there be if you were perceived only as a bargaining chip to strengthen the status and influence of the family?
Freedom of choice was not something a woman had then. And Lucretia was no exception. Even clothes were chosen for her.
When first your mother, and then your husband, tell you what to wear, it relieves a little of the headache. At least, you can deceive yourself with this thought. Maggie O’Farrell pays a lot of attention to the clothes of women of that time, so let’s take a look at Lucretia’s wardrobe.
Sottane is the main item of clothing of the Duchess. A kind of designer dress, consisting of a skirt, bodice and sleeves (they could be fastened with ribbons, laces or buttons). Lucretia wears it both under another layer of clothing and on its own.
Zimarra is a loose dress that a girl wears over the bottom layer, like a modern cardigan.
Giorneas is a sleeveless cape dress, open on both sides and in front. Fur lining makes it an outfit for any season.
Camicia is an undershirt made of white linen, wool, cotton, hemp or silk. It protects outerwear from sweat and dirt. Lucretia’s camicia is guaranteed to be decorated with sewing and decoration.
Scuffia is a net into which hair was laid. In Lucretia, it is woven from gold threads, decorated with stones and pearls.
It sounds and looks very beautiful.
Would you be willing to bring back Renaissance fashion at the cost of your own freedom? After all, not all women managed to get into progressive circles of like-minded people. Usually they spent their lives in a golden cage of a tigress.
When reviewing the historical development of the Ukrainian women’s movement, attention usually centers on its notable female founders such as Nataliya Kobrynska, Olena Pchilka, Sofiya Rusova, Ulyana Kravchenko, and others. Yet, behind these early struggles stood significant male antecedents and the active support of respected advocates of women’s issues—including Ivan Franko, alongside Mykola Hankevych, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Mykhailo Pavlyk, Vasyl Polyansky, and Volodymyr Shukhevych. However, this male reception of the women’s movement was sometimes ideologically marked by socialist slogans and lacked conceptual consistency within society. Even among supporters, there was no consensus regarding the nature and methods for addressing women’s issues.
A telling sign lies in Franko’s correspondence with Mykhailo Pavlyk (circa October 10, 1879), where Franko warned against singling out the women’s question apart from other social issues: “Neither does the women’s question stand out particularly sharply from among other issues…on the contrary, it recedes into the background (public economy, schools, etc.), and talking about it last year possibly did more harm than good.” He further expresses the view that influencing women’s progress in worldview is better done through sciences than through depictions of everyday women’s lives.
Franko’s Position: Pro-Feminist but Not a Movement Member
Despite cautious descriptions of Franko as a “pro-feminist”—someone who shares feminist ideas without formal affiliation—there is ample evidence in his work and public life of a genuine commitment to women’s emancipation. Franko was ahead of his time in advocating for women’s education, equality, economic independence, supporting and mentoring emerging women writers, and engaging with noted feminists in correspondence, journalism, and literary works. Interestingly, Franko did not use the term ’feminism’ directly, instead employing related terms such as “women’s question,” “women’s cause,” “emancipation,” “equal position,” and “equal rights.”
Early Engagement and Influence
Franko’s interest in women’s emancipation began in the mid-1870s while still a student—the period of his socialist inclinations. He discussed the “women’s question” with his close friend and fellow supporter of equality, Mykhailo Pavlyk, and together they even planned to translate John Stuart Mill’s influential manifesto “The Subjection of Women.” In their letters, they reveal concerns about women remaining passive and the necessity for women to assert their own voices and identities.
Franko’s respectful attitude towards women was formed from childhood and regarded as a feature of the national mentality. In his literary memoirs, he noted the “spiritual superiority over men” of women in artisan families, who, by managing household economy, raising children, and guiding their husbands, “acquired the traits of household leaders.” He recalled: “I had the impression that women in these families, if not ruling, then at least shared an equal position with men, distinguished by intelligence and energy, and above all by a sharp and tireless tongue.”
Engagement Through Literature and Activism
Franko’s relationships with numerous women writers—including mentoring, correspondence, editorial support, and critical engagement—were crucial in the genesis of Ukrainian women’s literature and the feminist movement. He played a decisive role in the founding of literary and advocacy societies, the editing of women’s almanacs, and supporting women’s public organization, while also sometimes offering strong editorial critique.
Modern Perspective
Franko occupies a unique position in the history of Ukrainian feminist discourse. His analytical approach, public activity, and creative work contributed significantly to gender sensitivity in national literature and social thought. While he did not explicitly call himself a feminist, his outlook and actions align closely with modern understandings of feminism—particularly in his vision of women as full participants in society, advocates of their own rights, and creators of their destinies.
Summary: Ivan Franko is widely recognized not as a card-carrying feminist by today’s definitions, but as a profound supporter and enabler of feminist ideas in Ukraine. His progressive stance included advocacy for women’s rights, education, and equality, as well as mentorship for the emerging generation of women writers and activists. Franko’s work and collaborations placed him among Ukraine’s most important early male allies to the women’s movement, leaving a multifaceted legacy still discussed in feminist and literary scholarship today.
Media scholars view gendered disinformation as “a subset of misogynistic abuse and violence against women, as false or misleading gendered and sexualized narratives, often with an intent and coordination to prevent women from participating in the public sphere and harm their reputation.”[1]
Gendered disinformation differs from general disinformation by violating women’s personal boundaries, promoting sexual and physical violence against women, etc. Therefore, gendered disinformation has multiple overlaps with rape culture, i.e., a culture in which sexual violence and other types of sexual abuse are normalized and embedded in a broader context. In such a culture, a woman’s sexual life and corporeality is either directly reduced to an object of male property or, through condemnation as immoral, is subject to attempts of social control, and thus also objectified.
An example of gendered disinformation in Ukraine is the story of war correspondent Iryna Sampan. After she signed a statement by the NGO Women in Media against the Uncensored Calendar project (nude photography by Channel 5 journalists to raise funds for the army), Iryna was attacked by the right-wing radical group C14 and national russian pro-Kremlin media. The former tried to buy nude photos of her from her friends and sent negative messages about her to her husband, while the latter called her an “escort” and “Zaluzhny’s lover.”[2] In both cases, the mere existence of a woman’s sexual life was used to discredit her position and herself in order to intimidate and control her.
Such stories are seen not only in Ukraine. In 2021, fake nude photos of Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock appeared in the German Internet segment.[3] In both cases, the fight against gendered disinformation should go beyond merely refuting fakes – it should foster the understanding of why the body and sexual agency belong to a woman only, the acceptance of different forms of sexual behavior, and dismantling the stereotypes of “female” and “male.” It is also important to counteract online and offline harassment at all levels and provide victims with comprehensive support.
However, gendered disinformation can also be viewed more broadly as the disinformation around feminism and related topics (LGBT+ rights), the instrumentalization of gendered narratives, or women themselves to advance political and other goals.
An example of such disinformation is the story of Olena Zelenska’s photo shoot for Vogue magazine. American conservative commentators reacted to it by spreading the idea that this photo session was funded by U.S. taxpayers and that it was a misuse of their money, and therefore, aid to Ukraine should be cut. In fact, U.S. aid comes as armaments, and the photo shoot was in no way related to that. Another, less obvious example was some Western feminists’ criticism of this photo session as glamorous and objectifying, on the sole basis that the photo was published in a glossy magazine. Even though there were no signs of objectification or other misogynistic aspects in the photos, as the first lady was in a subject position, in closed and formal clothes, in the setting of the presidential administration. However, a person who has not seen her, but has only read Western feminist criticism, may get a stereotypical (and false) impression. This is yet another example of gendered disinformation, although not malicious, but rather stemming from a dogmatic worldview and conviction of one’s truth despite the facts of reality.
Vogue cover with Olena Zelenska
Gendered disinformation can appear not only in the media but in other forms of public life, also. In 2018, the NGO Dukhovnist submitted a draft decision to a Brovary City Council session, which voted to appeal to the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament of Ukraine], the National Security and Defense Council, and other state institutions to remove from legal acts in education and from textbooks the norms and principles of sex education aimed at “overcoming gender stereotypes.” The appeal also called for a ban on “propaganda of various types of deviant sexual behavior,” in particular in the form of “so-called ‘equality marches,’ ‘pride parades,’ ‘gay parades,’ ‘queer culture festivals,’” etc. The reason for the appeal and the decision was the sex education project of Daryna Mizina, a Gender in Detail journalist who also worked with the local Brovary city media. The city council session interpreted the project as “encouraging sexual experimentation” and “promoting masturbation and homosexuality.”[4] The local media editorial office started receiving complaints about Daryna.
Gendered disinformation can target not only a certain woman, but also a group of women. russian (more often) and Ukrainian (less often) social media claim that since the beginning of the full-scale war, many Ukrainian women have moved abroad to engage in sex work, some brothels have opened with specifically Ukrainian women, this work is more desirable than other types of income, and Ukrainian women spread sexually transmitted diseases, but at the same time fill the state budget, which is not otherwise filled (“Zelensky sold Ukrainian women abroad”).[5]
Manipulating gender issues and promoting inequality is a constant component of far-right propaganda, as the entire patriarchal ideology is often an integral part of the far-right one. Emancipatory movements, such as socialism, liberalism, feminism, and the movement for the emancipation of the LGBT+ community, have been and are considered hostile by various versions of far-right and hatemongering ideologies. The strengthening of rape culture is a consequence of the spread of such ideologies, and gendered disinformation is their tool.
Far-right movements, patriarchy, male supremacy
The Third Reich considered family to be a genuine “cell” of the state. Ludwig Leonhardt, an expert in racial theory, argued that the family is a biological inheritance, and biological inheritance is the reproduction of the race. He authored “Marriage and Racial Hygiene,” which was promoted as a guide for proper marriage.
Another race theorist, Hermann Paul, believed that “free love” was detrimental to racial health. In general, the gender division in the culture of this era was extremely strong: the man held responsibility for all public affairs, and the woman, as the “keeper” of the family, was responsible for housework, raising children, and serving her husband’s needs.
The Nazis also defined standards for a woman’s body in reproductive and physiological terms: they discouraged decorative cosmetics, required women to conform to the standards of the Aryan race, and encouraged physical education and hygiene as a guarantee of reproducing a healthy race. Modern dances (jazz, etc.) were banned as encouraging women to become promiscuous.[6]
The famous far-right theorist of the first half of the 20th century, Julius Evola, considered men and women’s physical dimorphism to be a reflection of spiritual dimorphism. In his view, men and women had their own separate paths in life, and deviation from them was “a conflicting and unnatural way of being.” Manhood could be of two types: a warrior and an ascetic. Womanhood also had two types: a lover and a mother, and both of these types existed as subordinate to men (husbands and sons, respectively). Self-expression in these areas required a woman to forsake everything masculine in her personality, and a man, respectively, to forsake everything feminine. Evola linked all this to ancient traditional cultures, though indirectly, not in the ordinary sense of what should be borrowed from the traditional cultures for modernity, but rather in the spiritual and symbolic sense.[7]
Our contemporary, the known russian far-right political philosopher and propagandist Alexander Dugin, also did not miss an opportunity to comment on feminism. It is much more difficult to analyze him than previous thinkers, because his philosophy spans from an eclectic mix of very different ideas to a set of words that are only grammatically connected. Nevertheless, it can be deduced that he roots in the legend of the Great Mother, who was allegedly subdued by men, and now women are gaining strength again, and therefore humanity is facing such horrors as atheism, materialism, and progress.[8]
This is a vivid example of gendered disinformation and an unscientific approach, the promotion of a mythological worldview. On another occasion, Dugin generalized “LGBT+, perverted feral feminism, transgender people, wokeism, cancel culture, and the entire culture of the modern West” as “systematic demonization of the civilizational scale” and an illustration that “counter-initiation powers” have gained access to authority in Western Europe and the United States.[9] One should not look for any other meaning in this than incitement of hatred towards the West and all the mentioned groups and phenomena among all who know that demons are bad.
Another contemporary conservative thinker is the famous Canadian psychologist and bestselling author Jordan Peterson. In 2016, he participated in a local debate about transgender people on the conservative side, refusing to address people by their preferred pronouns. Peterson was manipulatively comparing transgender people and their allies to left-wing radicals, left-wing radicals to Nazis, and criticized Marxists and postmodernists as just along for the ride. As in Dugin’s case, there is no need to analyze this intellectual mess in detail, because its main purpose is to vent supremacists’ frustration, who feel the loss of male privilege and consider themselves to be affected by the emancipatory tendencies of society in general and by allegedly manipulative women in particular.
According to Peterson himself, 80% of his YouTube audience are young men.[10]
Jordan Peterson
In recent years, U.S. commentators have begun to distinguish male supremacy as a separate social phenomenon. Male supremacists advocate rigid gender roles and protest against feminism. While “ordinary” far-right movements have patriarchal views internal to their ideology, male supremacists focus specifically on the gender aspect.
The word “incel” (involuntary celibate) did not originate out of the male supremacist community, but it quickly spread there. The incel subculture’ worldview is based on the assumption that women choose attractive men and leave unattractive ones behind, which is expressed in a sharply misogynistic and coarse way. The subculture reduces the image of women to a lustful beneficiary who manipulates men for sex or money. Although this conventionally stereotypical woman has no interest in incels, they still consider themselves better than she is. In their ideology, there is a hierarchy among men, and women are basically below all levels of the male hierarchy.
This worldview paradigm fits neatly into the rape culture because it assumes that women’s attractiveness and sexual activity globally belong to men and are simply “unfairly” distributed among them, i.e., not in the way incels would like. Since women are not rushing to line up for the bearers of the misogynistic worldview, thus prolonging their celibacy, the view works like a self-fulfilling prophecy. This worldview also belongs to the conservative spectrum, because, according to incels, “before” (i.e., before the onset of feminism), the distribution of sexual “benefits” that women “bestowed” upon men was “fairer.” The incel ideology portrays its supporters as the “injured” party.[11]
There are no separate statistics on whether incels commit sexual crimes, but some hate crimes are associated with them, which links incels to the “ordinary” far right. In 2020, there was a terrorist attack in the German city of Hanau: the attacker killed nine people in several bars overnight, then returned home and shot his mother and himself. On his personal website, the 43-year-old terrorist published a manifesto in which, among other extreme racist statements, he said that he had never been intimate with a woman.[12] In the United States and Canada, people associated with the incel subculture have also committed several terrorist attacks that killed up to 50 people.
How russia is spreading conservative and violent narratives
The regime maintains the patriarchal attitudes of russian society at the level of both federal policy and local practices. A story in 2015 shocked russian feminists: in Chechnya, the head of the local police department forced a 17-year-old girl to marry him, even though he was three times her age and already had a wife. Ramzan Kadyrov himself attended the wedding, and the girl was led by his “right hand man” Magomed Daudov. Despite protests from feminists and the human rights community, the wedding took place, and nothing is known about the girl’s fate after. The Ombudsman for Children’s Rights verbally normalized this situation, in particular with the phrase “some women are wrinkled as early as 27,” which he later had to apologize for.[13] In Dagestan, such cruel misogynistic practices as female genital mutilation have spread in recent years, with more than a thousand girls undergoing this surgery every year.[14]
Forced wedding in Chechnya
In addition to reviving traditional patriarchal practices, there are new ones that are quite modern. The “male state” is a confirmed extremist movement, and it has been banned even in russia itself. This is a community of thousands of men, a vivid realization of rape culture, as it seeks to control women’s sexuality. These men publish photos of women without their consent to an audience of thousands, with mocking comments allegedly exposing “whores”, and private harassment, including threatening the women to send porn to their families. This movement is not only misogynistic, it also has a prominent racist focus: if a woman is suspected of having sex with a non-white man, and such suspicions are quite common for the movement, the extent of the abuse increases. For such women, they have coined a separate term: “inkwell.” The members of the “male state” call their ideology “national patriarchy.”[15]
After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the level of everyday, domestic, and sexual violence increased in russia itself. However, the media and russian psychologists do not associate the war of aggression and the rape of Ukrainian women with patriarchy, instead attributing the increase in aggression to war-related PTSD, thus justifying the violence.[16] This means that the forces that should counteract rape culture are infected with it.
russia’s patriarchal and conservative policies make it an attractive partner for far-right movements in other countries. Contrary to widespread perception, the Kremlin does not usually directly fund European far-right political parties. Rather, it is a win-win situation: for the world’s far-right, russia is a strong and influential country with a conservative regime. In turn, representatives of far-right forces act as “international experts” for domestic russian “consumption” and perform other useful roles, such as observers at illegitimate “referendums.” However, direct russian support can be found in the area of non-partisan cooperation, while media in different countries systematically pick up disinformation narratives favorable to russia.
Conservative family policy is a significant part of what russia exports abroad through disinformation narratives.
The World Congress of Families is a global network of organizations that oppose LGBT+ rights and abortion. It was founded in 1997 by American Christians and russians concerned about the demographic decline. It is believed to be funded by conservative russian oligarchs Konstantin Malofeev (who financed russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and is under numerous international sanctions) and Vladimir Yakunin.[17] In reality, the Congress operates as a tool of russian soft power, not only promoting patriarchal views on family and gender issues, but also spreading pro-russian political narratives. For many years, dozens of politicians from all over Europe have participated in WCF events, and in general, over 700 people from more than 50 countries have joined this network over the past 15 years.[18]
According to the former French representative of the WCF, Fabrice Sorlen, “this Europe of people and nations will replace a technocratic Europe with a more traditional European civilization; it will promote Christianity in a Europe hitherto dominated by the LGBT lobby. It must unite with Vladimir Putin’s russia to create a version of Europe that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific.”[19]
Conservative tendencies are spreading from russia to neighboring friendly countries. In Georgia, Levan Vasadze, a major real estate investor and former board member of a number of large companies in russia, known for his anti-immigrant, anti-liberal, and ultra-religious views, founded the Demographic Revival of Georgia Foundation, which is part of the WCF. In May 2021, Vasadze announced his official entry into politics as the founder of the “Unity, Essence, Hope” social movement. In the same year, he called on the government to cancel Tbilisi Pride, which was actually right-wing radicals violently interrupted.[20] A Moldovan President himself, Igor Dodon, patronized the 2018 WCF Congress in Chisinau.[21]
Moldovan President Igor Dodon meets with russian Patriarch Kirill
russian gendered disinformation in Ukraine
Research by the Ukrainian Women’s Fund shows that in Ukraine, the conservative part of society could also have received support from the russian Federation, and gendered disinformation was the channel of that support. Narratives benefitting russia were broadcast through affiliated structures (in particular, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), the media, and other religious and conservative organizations and initiatives.
The researchers imply that in 2013, russia conducted a strategic information operation to prevent Ukraine’s European integration, which was supported by a tactical information operation to prevent the adoption of draft law No. 2342 (On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine) and further expansion of the scope of the law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine.” In the russian and Ukrainian media, similar narratives were observed. They were manipulating the concepts of “sexual orientation,” “non-traditional orientation,” “European values,” and “gender” as those that disrupt the family institution in Ukraine. There was also an attempt to form opinion with draft law No. 2342 and further expansion of the scope of the law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine” as a step towards the dominance of fascist ideology in Ukraine (which is obviously not a fight against real fascism, but the use of an emotionally charged term to incite hatred).[22]
russian narratives in Ukraine did not stop after 2014. For example, in September-October 2015, Vitaly Milonov, a member of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly, unleashed a wave of discrimination against the LGBT+ community in the russian media. Simultaneously, narratives similar to Milonov’s (family values are the same as Christian values, the state must protect the family from the LGBT+ community, Ukraine – or russia for Milonov – stands strong in preserving traditional family values, etc.) spread in Ukraine with the common message “joining the EU will lead to the destruction of the family.”[23]
In 2021, a delegation of the Polish traditionalists Ordo Iuris visited the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation aiming to convince them against ratifying the Istanbul Convention. Polish feminist activist Clementine Sukhanov conducted her own investigation and provided supporting documents that Ordo Iuris is indirectly funded by russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev.[24] In Ukraine, the organization signed a memorandum of cooperation with Ruslan Kukharchuk’s conservative association All Together. [25] Kukharchuk’s other organization, Love Against Homosexuality, had been distributing leaflets as early as 2017 with not only conservative disinformation (the rights of LGBT+ people allegedly contradict human rights), but also with images of St. George’s ribbons on them (the ribbon is a russian military symbol). The organization Katechon took part in the same action. They borrowed the rare Greek word, which has no family or heterosexual connotations, from the think tank of the same name. This think tank is a joint project of the aforementioned Malofeev and Dugin.[26]
Leaflet of the organization “Love Against Homosexuality”
A news report about Ordo Iuris’ visit to Ukraine also bore signs of disinformation. It presented Ordo Iuris as “an independent legal organization based in Poland, accredited by the European Parliament… aiming to promote legal culture based on respect for human dignity and rights.”[27] In reality, it is a Polish branch of the international pseudo-Catholic movement Tradition, Family, Property (Tradição, Família e Propriedade), founded in Brazil in 1960, which allegedly promotes the “Catholic crusade.” In fact, it is not subject to the Vatican and has a history of extremism in Latin American countries (in particular, its members allegedly plotted to assassinate the Pope during his visit to Venezuela in 1984, after which the movement was banned in the country). In France, the TFP movement is considered a destructive cult (raising funds for unspecified purposes, obscure hierarchy and structure, and progressing requirements for members). The Canadian Bureau of Immigration and Refugees also lists TFP as a “religious paramilitary group.” The Vatican does not recognize this movement and is conducting an internal investigation into it (in particular, for using exorcism and rumors that all recent popes are controlled by the devil).[28]
Conclusion
To summarize, gendered disinformation is a practical tool for spreading rape culture and normalizing violent attitudes towards women and violence as such. Gendered disinformation can be disguised as “conservatism” or “family values,” but it does not lose its cannibalistic nature. russia was and is using gendered disinformation in various forms as part of its imperial propaganda, in particular by clogging the Ukrainian information space and supporting conservative movements and activists in our country and other countries.
After the russian federation’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine finally ratified the Istanbul Convention, and the prevalence of conservative narratives in the media and public space decreased. This can be explained by the fact that conservative activists have more important things to do and security services are working more effectively.
Photos: Annie Leibovitz for Vogue, Rene Johnston / Toronto Star / Getty Images, Radio Svoboda, Facebook page of Ihor Dodon, Zorian Kis
A few years ago, social media was full of loud jokes and irony about amendments to Ukraine’s Criminal Code that strengthened accountability for sexual and domestic violence. One of the main targets of ridicule was the clause on consent to sexual contact. Now, four years after those legal changes, the idea of a culture of consent has become much clearer and more widely understood.
Read more about these changes in the article by Kateryna Viter.
The reasons behind this social shift include active youth education, more accurate and sensitive media coverage, and the advocacy of laws protecting against sexual violence. In other words, building a culture of consent in Ukraine is a daily effort shared by people across different fields — blogging, journalism, politics, advocacy, psychology, and non-formal education.
Gender in Detail spoke with active women from these sectors to learn how they are helping transform the so-called “rape culture” into a culture of consent, and why doing so is especially important right now.
Read more about the difference between a culture of consent and a culture of rape in the article by Yevheniia Dyshleva.
Psychology
“Previously, no one spoke about the culture of consent — society assumed women should be submissive.”
Teaching conscious consent, addressing stereotypes, promoting nonviolent communication, and supporting children and teenagers in schools and universities — this is only part of how psychologists influence personal development and the formation of personal boundaries.
According to Maryna Didenko, PhD in Psychology and expert in tolerance and nondiscrimination, the culture of consent in a psychological context is a set of beliefs or behavioral habits that a person uses to interact with others, including their partner. These habits are shaped by attitudes, upbringing, and learned behavior.
“Previously, no one spoke about the culture of consent, so society mostly believed that women should be obedient. There were stereotypes that sex is essential for men but not for women. Such ideas harm both sides — women are pressured not to refuse sex, and men are pressured to always want it,” Didenko explains.
The formation of a culture of consent in adulthood happens through self-awareness, personal development, psychotherapy, and education. These processes help people reshape the basic beliefs that drive behavior.
The psychologist also notes that during the full-scale war, many couples are separated and cannot engage sexually in person. However, she sees this as an opportunity to build consent culture through communication — by discussing uncomfortable topics, including sex.
“From a distance, partners can talk about their values, desires, and fantasies. This helps them maintain intimacy and lays the foundation for healthy interaction in the future,” she says.
At the same time, war brings heightened aggression. Unprocessed emotions, alcohol or drug use, and other stressors heavily affect human interaction, including in sexual contexts. The number of domestic and sexual violence cases has already increased. Didenko believes that zero tolerance and social condemnation will gradually influence all social groups and lead to real change.
Blogosphere
“If people start googling what ‘active consent’ or ‘active non-consent’ means — I feel an inner victory.”
TikTok and Instagram bloggers play a significant role in forming Ukraine’s culture of consent. They address gender stereotypes, sexual and domestic violence, discrimination, and related topics — reaching teenagers and young adults, the main audiences of these platforms.
Many bloggers use their platforms for educational outreach, explaining the importance of consent and mutual respect in relationships. Creators such as “U Trusakh” (@utrusakh), “Moe Dilo” (@moe_dilo), and bloggers Emma Antoniuk and Yana Brenzei from “Nam palae” (@nam_palae) regularly publish videos analyzing high-profile harassment cases, sharing statistics, and raising awareness.
Ukrainian sex educator and blogger Asya Say (on Instagram and TikTok: @asyasay) believes that understanding active consent can save relationships — and even lives — because it reduces the risk of violence from the very beginning.
“For our society, the culture of consent is still a kind of mysterious creature. Even though there’s been ongoing work on nonviolent communication, people still react with confusion when they hear about consent. But if they start googling what ‘active consent’ or ‘active non-consent’ means afterward, I feel an inner victory,” says Asya.
She notes that some Ukrainians still view asking for consent as a sign of weakness, believing that questions like ‘Can I do this?’ or ‘Do you want this?’ kill romance.
“But more people are beginning to realize that this is about their own safety. In my experience, people under 30 are more receptive to the idea of consent. It’s harder with older generations, especially those deeply rooted in patriarchal or so-called ‘traditional family values,’” she adds.
Asya emphasizes that children should start learning about sexual consent around the ages of 9–10, since the average age of sexual initiation in Ukraine is 15 — even though, under Ukrainian law, teenagers that age cannot legally give consent to sexual activity.
According to Asya, it is also crucial to promote the culture of consent in mass culture — in films, TV series, and books. That way, it will no longer be seen as “a new idea imported from the West” but will instead become an unquestioned social norm.
Politics
“Work with civil society should start with conversations with children.”
Another major driver in shaping the culture of consent in Ukraine is legislation — or more precisely, the people who design, adopt, and implement it. Lawmakers determine how quickly new frameworks that strengthen protection for survivors of any kind of violence are introduced and how effectively perpetrators are held accountable.
Among those advocating for legislation to combat domestic and sexual violence and to establish the concept of consent in law is MP Inna Sovsun and her team. In March 2023, Sovsun submitted a bill to the Verkhovna Rada that would allow criminal proceedings for sexual violence without a formal complaint from the victim. She also actively supported the ratification of the Istanbul Convention.
Gender in Detail spoke with Maria Klius, a human rights advocate and assistant to MP Inna Sovsun, who writes legislative texts and anti-discrimination reviews for educational materials.
“For ten years, everyone who worked on advocating the ratification of the Istanbul Convention talked to politicians about its importance. Over time, this idea became so ingrained that now, as we work on implementation, we no longer have to explain the basics — like why women need specific protection,” Maria said.
As part of broader advocacy efforts, public awareness has also increased, since many of Sovsun’s initiatives are widely discussed — from anti-discriminatory school textbooks to registered civil partnerships.
Maria emphasizes that while the ratification of the Istanbul Convention was a huge victory for Ukraine, the next step — implementation — is even more challenging. The Verkhovna Rada is now considering several bills amending the Code of Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Procedure Code to regulate investigations of sexual violence, plea agreements, and related issues.
“Our team also works with the Ministry of Education, because we are still fighting problematic phrasing in ‘Health Basics’ textbooks. We receive complaints about victim-blaming and other harmful narratives that contradict the idea of a culture of consent. This is critical, because if we want to work with civil society, we must start by talking to children,” Maria explained.
Maria and her colleagues aim to reform the expert review process for school textbooks to ensure it involves qualified professionals, since current reviewers often ignore problematic content — even when students themselves notice it.
Law
“Voluntary consent is mandatory in every case.”
Thanks to their legal expertise and work in protecting survivors of violence, female lawyers and human rights defenders also contribute to dismantling rape culture. They consult victims, help file complaints with law enforcement, and represent women who have experienced violence in court — ensuring that perpetrators face justice.
They also collaborate with NGOs and advocacy initiatives aimed at combating violence and harassment, conduct trainings and legal education programs, and lobby for improvements in gender-based violence legislation. One of the key organizations working in this field is the Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association “JurFem.”
As Marta Pavlyshyn, a lawyer and program manager at JurFem: Education, explains, the conversation about consent is directly tied to the 2019 legal reforms. Previously, under Ukraine’s Criminal Code, rape was defined only in cases where there was resistance or the victim was in a helpless state. The Istanbul Convention, which Ukraine signed in 2011 and ratified 11 years later, introduced the notion of consent to sex as central. This change criminalized acts that previously were not considered rape — even though they were committed against the victim’s will through intimidation or coercion.
The reforms also criminalized sexual violence within marriage, which had often been ignored due to the idea of “marital duty.” Today, the law makes it clear: it does not matter whether the individuals are married or not — voluntary consent is mandatory in every case.
“Ratifying the Convention legally obliges Ukraine to implement and report on its provisions. In terms of consent, the legislative framework is already sufficient: we have criminalized sex without consent and established liability for it, as the Convention requires,” Marta stressed.
According to her, the next step is to change investigation practices, since outdated methods from before 2019 are still common. Some investigators still focus on the presence of physical injuries or the so-called “virginity test.” However, the key issue should be whether the accused obtained voluntary consent from the victim.
Read a detailed legal analysis of Ukrainian legislation from the perspective of the culture of consent by Kateryna Viter.
For survivors of sexual violence and all forms of gender discrimination, the JurFem: Support hotline offers free and confidential legal assistance: 📞 068 145-55-90 or 0 800 30 55 90.
JurFem lawyers provide full legal support — from consultation to courtroom representation. In one current case, JurFem attorneys represent a 14-year-old girl from Zakarpattia, who was raped by three teenage boys.
Media
“The issue of sexual violence is about a violation of the law — and about how justice should work.”
Media professionals play a crucial role in raising public awareness about sexual and domestic violence. Their work creates public pressure on the government and legislative bodies to adopt necessary laws and policy decisions. At the same time, it helps strengthen the culture of consent and build a safer environment for everyone in Ukraine.
Through sensitive and accurate coverage of difficult topics and publication of high-quality materials on cases of violence, journalists help audiences form a proper understanding of such events, challenge gender stereotypes, and dismantle the victim-blaming narrative.
However, the media’s handling of sexual violence remains controversial. In February 2023, StopCor editor-in-chief Maryna Titova contacted Dana Okomaniuk, founder of the platform goodjob, who had publicly shared her story of being raped as a student years earlier. Titova asked Dana for the rapist’s phone number to obtain “his side” of the story. When Dana criticized this request as unethical and insensitive, the journalist published an article defending her actions as adherence to “journalistic standards.”
Read more about how Ukrainian media cover rape in a series of articles by Olha Bilousenko: “‘The neighbors said nothing bad about him’: how Ukrainian media write about rapists,” “Not a sensation but a crime: how to write about rape without causing harm,” and “Accusations and unsolicited advice: how Ukrainian media write about survivors of sexual violence.”
Writers and human rights advocates such as Larysa Denysenko, Liza Kuzmenko (head of the NGO Women in Media), and Oksana Pavlenko, editor-in-chief of Divoche.media, analyze and explain how journalists should write about sexual violence responsibly.
Another prominent voice is Tetiana Troshchynska, editor-in-chief and radio host at Hromadske Radio. She emphasizes that journalism plays an essential role in shaping a culture of consent — especially when not only niche but also mainstream media with mass audiences begin to address these topics.
“Sometimes the audience doesn’t even understand what a media piece is about. That’s why outlets with strong editorial principles must not back down — even if readers or viewers react negatively, saying things like ‘this problem doesn’t exist’ or ‘are we supposed to sign consent forms before sex now?’ It’s important to keep explaining these issues and stay on course,” Tetiana said.
For journalists who are just beginning to cover sexual violence, she advises not only to report incidents, but also to help advance justice and give survivors space to be heard and supported.
“The topic of sexual violence is about breaking the law — and about how justice should function. But it’s also about a person who has survived, found inner strength, and moved forward. The media should not focus on the survivor’s age, weight, hair color, or clothing,” she emphasized.
Journalists should also help survivors feel safe to report crimes to law enforcement and understand the importance of working with lawyers who can help them seek justice in the least traumatic way possible.
Education
“Agreeing to go somewhere or have a drink is not the same as consenting to sex.”
Non-formal education is another powerful tool for cultivating respect, mutual understanding, and consent. Today, lectures, workshops, and seminars on communication, relationship boundaries, and consent are becoming increasingly popular in Ukraine. Such educational programs are offered by organizations like Teenergizer, TolerSpace, Divchata, Vpershe, and by educators such as Yuliia Yarmolenko, Kris Shapran, and Marianna Anoshchenko.
Olha Kukula, sex education trainer and coordinator of the initiative Girls Create, stresses that the culture of consent must be formed from early childhood. The first thing a child should learn is that their body belongs to them, and no one has the right to touch it without permission. Children in kindergartens and other group settings should be taught the “underwear rule” and how to say “I don’t like this.” As teenagers, they need to understand that every form of interaction — a hug, a kiss, or a touch — requires consent.
“We still live in a culture of rape rather than a culture of consent. You can see it in how people react to high-profile cases of sexual violence. Girls are often blamed for going to someone’s house or being drunk. But agreeing to go somewhere or have a drink does not equal consent to sex. This must be openly discussed with young people,” Olha emphasized.
This summer, she worked as a tutor at sex education training sessions for school and university students. Participants discussed sexual violence (including harassment on public transport, catcalling, and street harassment) and the concept of consent. Some girls later shared personal stories of harassment or how adults had blamed victims in similar cases.
Olha admits it’s hard to measure the success of such work — trainers often don’t know how deeply their lessons affect participants, especially young people. Still, she is convinced these sessions are crucial for teenagers, who need not only information but also support — since many already have negative experiences yet fear speaking up for fear of being blamed again for “improper behavior.”
Courses, Series, and Books
The development of a culture of consent requires active engagement from society, as well as support from education, media, organizations, and government. This culture helps build a fair and equal society and creates a safer environment for women and children, who are most often subjected to harassment and various forms of violence.
Gender in Detail has compiled several useful resources to help you better understand the concept of the culture of consent:
Free online course “Sexual Education” on Prometheus. The course provides answers to the most common questions teenagers have about sex and debunks popular myths about sexual life.
TV series Sex Education (Netflix). The show explores topics such as gender identity, hypersexuality, masturbation, teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and the importance of contraception.
Book Doing It: Let’s Talk About Sex by Hannah Witton. This global youth bestseller discusses sensitive but essential topics — first relationships, virginity and sexual experience, the negative effects of pornography and sexting, and healthy perceptions of one’s body and sexuality.
The scandal surrounding Kostiantyn Temliak: a brief timeline of events
On August 9, photographer Anastasiia Soloviova (Chornobai) publicly accused her ex-boyfriend, actor Kostiantyn Temliak, of years of domestic abuse and humiliation. She described numerous incidents of physical and psychological violence. According to her, Temliak hit her, pulled her by the hair, twisted her arms, pushed her, controlled her life, and forbade her from communicating with friends or wearing revealing clothes.
Anastasiia shared photos showing bruises on her body, videos of the actor’s aggressive behavior, and screenshots of abusive messages as evidence. Following her statement, musician Moonmanita claimed that Temliak had sent her inappropriate messages when she was 15 years old. Temliak publicly admitted to using physical force against Soloviova during their relationship, though he has not commented on other allegations — including the alleged sexual correspondence with a minor.
After lawyers from the Miller Law Firm became Anastasiia’s legal representatives, she was officially recognized as a victim in the criminal case. With the firm’s involvement, she underwent the initial investigative procedures. The legal team collected and submitted evidence to the police, indicating not only violence against Soloviova but also other possible cases of abuse against women, and even the alleged corruption of a minor.
The situation resurfaced in the media just before the 2025 Golden Dzyga National Film Awards ceremony.
Divided reactions within the film community
The decision to present Temliak with an award sparked public outrage. Opinions in the film industry were sharply divided: some argued that the Ukrainian Film Academy should have at least postponed honoring the actor until the investigation was completed, while others stressed that such a prestigious award should reflect not only artistic talent but also moral integrity.
Actress and Academy member Olesia Zhurakivska joined the critics, sharply condemning the decision in a public post. She wrote that those responsible for awarding Temliak were “mocking victims and undermining the foundations of a civilized society.” Zhurakivska reminded readers that similar cases had occurred before — such as director Andrii Bilous, who was granted an academic title despite allegations of sexual harassment.
Temliak’s decision to return the award
Temliak ultimately responded to public demands by voluntarily returning his award the day after the ceremony. In his official statement, the actor said he was giving up the prize because the situation around his name required personal and legal resolution. He considered it inappropriate to keep an award that symbolizes public recognition amid such controversy and expressed a desire to focus on his work and cooperate honestly with investigators.
“Returning the award is, for me, a sign of respect for the film community, the audience, and the award itself,” Temliak explained.
The statement was generally welcomed online — many commentators noted that the actor had shown greater accountability than the award organizers, who had failed this reputational test.
Ukrainian Film Academy’s response
Following the backlash, the Ukrainian Film Academy announced plans to review its award regulations. Executive Director Hanna Machukh explained that at the time of the voting and award ceremony, there were no mechanisms to revoke a prize once it had been granted. The Academy has now begun polling its members about the possibility of annulling Temliak’s award and intends to amend its regulations next year to allow such reviews in similar situations.
The Academy also clarified that the voting for Temliak’s nomination took place before the public accusations and criminal proceedings were initiated and that Temliak himself is not a member of the Academy. At the same time, it pledged to communicate its stance and actions more transparently in future cases of this nature.
Why the Academy Failed the Reputation Test — and What It Should Have Done
First of all, there was more than enough time.
From August 9 — when the first evidence of abuse was made public — to the September 13 awards ceremony, 35 days passed. That’s more than a month — ample time for the Academy’s board or general assembly to convene and make a decision: at the very least, to suspend or revoke the award. For comparison, Hollywood institutions have taken decisive action within days.
After the allegations against Harvey Weinstein, both the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences and BAFTA expelled him within a week. Netflix and the International Academy of Television Arts & Sciences ended their cooperation with Kevin Spacey within days of the accusations. BAFTA revoked Noel Clarke’s award immediately after The Guardian’s investigation was published. In all these cases, the decisions were swift and principled — no court rulings, no bureaucratic excuses.
Secondly, the Academy is a private organizationч
The Ukrainian Film Academy is registered as a non-governmental organization (NGO). By law, NGOs are private associations created by individuals, not the state. They are not government bodies, and thus not bound by the principle “only what is explicitly allowed by law is permitted.” In private law, the reverse applies: “everything that is not forbidden is allowed.” This means that even without a special procedure in its bylaws, the Academy had every right to act — to make a reputational decision based on ethics and values.
All statements like “we don’t have such a mechanism in the regulations” or “changes will come next year” are manipulations. No law prevented the Academy from convening urgently and making an extraordinary decision. Western institutions have done so repeatedly — cancelling awards, cutting ties, or expelling members without pre-defined “procedures” — simply because the situation demanded it.
Thirdly, the Academy demonstrated reputational impotence
Instead of taking responsibility, the Academy hid behind talk of legal formalities, the absence of a court verdict, and promises of “discussion” and “future reform.” That is not defending values — it is abandoning them.
Reputational responsibility is independent from legal responsibility. It’s not about punishment through law, but about public trust. When the prestige of the country’s main film award is at stake, taking a principled stance should have been unconditional. Otherwise, the award’s credibility — and the Academy’s — collapses.
The proper course of action was clear
Emergency board meeting or general assembly.
A public statement: the award is suspended or revoked.
Protecting institutional integrity and expressing solidarity with survivors of violence.
This is standard global practice, and precisely what Ukrainian society expected. Instead, the Academy chose bureaucratic inaction — and lost the chance to prove that values, not formalities, guide the film community.
Legal vs Reputational Responsibility
The Temliak case exposed a fundamental misunderstanding: the difference between legal and reputational responsibility.
Legal responsibility operates within the legal system — it begins only when guilt is proven in court or confirmed by official authorities. It requires evidence, due process, and adherence to the presumption of innocence. This is a lengthy process involving investigation, trial, and a final verdict. Only then does the state impose punishment — such as imprisonment or fines.
Reputational responsibility, however, is entirely different. It’s not about courts or police — it’s about the community’s response to unethical or harmful behavior. It comes into play when a person faces professional and social consequences — loss of trust, career setbacks, or exclusion — even without a court ruling. It’s a “social sanction” imposed by peers and institutions that refuse to associate with someone whose behavior contradicts shared values.
In the film industry, reputational consequences almost always precede legal ones. After multiple #MeToo allegations, studios and institutions routinely terminated contracts or rescinded awards — regardless of pending legal proceedings.
The key point: reputational responsibility does not replace legal responsibility — but it also does not depend on it. One does not need to wait for a court ruling to make a morally right decision. When it comes to awards, public honors, or trust, organizations and peers have both the right and the duty to act on credible allegations.
The presumption of innocence governs criminal law; in professional and creative communities, another principle applies — the presumption of a safe environment. The priority must be the well-being and dignity of the community’s members — especially in creative settings built on trust and mutual respect.
Reputational Responsibility in Global Cinema
In the global film industry, swift reaction to misconduct has become the norm — especially since the #MeToo movement. According to Axios, since 2017, hundreds of influential men have faced allegations of sexual harassment or violence; at least 201 lost their jobs or high-ranking positions, while only a handful faced formal convictions.
Some of the most well-known examples:
Harvey Weinstein (USA): In 2017, after dozens of women accused the producer of sexual assault and harassment, he was immediately dismissed from his own company, and the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences unanimously expelled him. At the time, no charges had yet been filed — but the film community refused to wait.
Kevin Spacey (USA): After several men accused him of sexual misconduct in October 2017, Netflix halted all projects involving him, removed House of Cards from production, and reshot entire scenes of All the Money in the World with another actor. No court decision was needed — reputational risk alone justified the action.
Brett Ratner (USA): When six women accused the director of harassment in November 2017, Warner Bros. immediately terminated its partnership and cancelled upcoming projects. Although there were no convictions, Ratner has effectively been barred from the industry ever since.
These examples show that reputation carries real accountability — and that institutions maintaining public trust cannot afford to remain silent.
Why Reputational Responsibility Matters
Global experience shows that reputational mechanisms are a way for society to self-regulate, especially where formal law acts too slowly or fails to respond effectively. When an industry takes responsibility to remove individuals whose behavior violates basic norms, it thereby:
Protects potential victims. Reputational sanctions help prevent further abuse. For example, suspending a teacher accused of misconduct immediately after the first complaint can protect students even during an ongoing investigation. In Temliak’s case, his former partner admitted she had remained silent for years out of fear and shame. A system of reputational accountability creates an environment where survivors see the community’s response and feel supported — it becomes easier to speak up, knowing they will be heard and protected.
Upholds declared values. If organizations publicly claim that “violence has no place in the industry,” the logical step is to avoid supporting those accused of violent behavior. Otherwise, words and actions lose alignment.
Safeguards the reputation of the community and the award itself. The prestige of an award like the Golden Dzyga — or any other — declines if it is given to someone with a questionable moral reputation. Such recognition should represent not only artistic excellence but also integrity. Reputational oversight protects the credibility of the brand and the audience’s trust: ignoring a scandal can undermine the legitimacy of the entire award.
Drives social change. When a well-known actor or producer faces reputational consequences, it sends a clear message: such behavior is unacceptable, and consequences are inevitable. This acts as a prevention for potential offenders and as validation for survivors. The success of the #MeToo movement lies precisely in this — public exposure was followed by swift repercussions, gradually transforming cultural norms.
In summary, the situation with Kostiantyn Temliak became a kind of test for the Ukrainian film community. Initially, this test was not passed properly — excuses prevailed over moral imperatives.
The key lesson: “Innocent until proven guilty” does not mean worthy of awards or trust until proven guilty. Legal responsibility will take time and deliver a verdict, but reputational responsibility already defines a clear boundary: violence and abuse will find no justification within the creative community, and protecting its values should not require a court seal.
In June-July 2025, “Gender in Details” within the framework of the Human Rights Academy 2.0 by Gender Stream project, with the support of the Center for Disaster Philanthropy, implemented the project “We Were. We Are. We Will Be” – a campaign to support LGBT+ people and provide visibility to their achievements and daily challenges. We united a number of Ukrainian businesses around the idea of end-to-end support. This was an attempt to show: Pride is not just a march or a one-time action, it is everyday life, and LGBT+ people exist, create, fight, love in this everyday life, without having basic rights like other people.
Why this idea? The name and, accordingly, the slogan “We Were. We Are. We Will Be” became the basis of the campaign, because it speaks of continuity. LGBT+ people have always been a part of Ukrainian culture, history and art. They are also creating Ukrainian history today – on the front lines, in business, in volunteering, next to everyone. They will be in the future that we are building together.
In times of war, when part of society is being pushed out or marginalized, it is important to remember: visibility and support are not luxuries, they are a matter of dignity and the right to life.
How did businesses get involved? Several Ukrainian businesses joined the campaign — and it was more than just a partnership. At a time when open support for LGBT+ people in Ukraine still requires courage, each of these companies took an important step: they told their customers “you are not alone.”
For example, together with the publishing house “Laboratory”, we talked about books that create space for research, including yourself. The publishing house “Laboratory” consistently supports the idea of equal rights both in Ukrainian-language publications and in translations, so their selection of books has become extremely diverse. Among others, we can mention the cooperation with the project “Agents of Blood”, because “Blood is not about gender, blood is about life”, and together with them on Donor Day we will analyze stereotypes and prohibitions on donation for transgender people.
All these posts, collections of information, and even laconic symbolic publications together became signs of safety and support for LGBT+ people who are looking for a space where they can breathe freely every day.
What did we get?
This campaign became not just a few posts or collections – it became a symbolic sign of the times. “We were. We are. We will be” resonated with both those who belong to LGBT+ people and those who simply want to see Ukraine open and strong. People recognized familiar brands and logos, and this gave them a sense of security: if even a business dares to say it out loud, it means we are moving forward.
On social networks, the campaign received many warm words – comments, messages, reactions. For some, it was the first reminder that Pride Month exists even during war. For some, it was an unexpected moment of support from a favorite company. For the businesses themselves, this was an important experience: to publicly declare solidarity, despite the risks and possible hateful comments.
Such steps are not always measured by reach figures or thematic sales statistics. Their real result is in changing the atmosphere and attitude, in the feeling that LGBT+ people are visible and welcome in the public space. And this is the greatest value: the campaign opened the door to a conversation that seemed too risky yesterday.
The conversation continues We created practical tools that remain after the campaign ends:
A brand book with visual recommendations that helps businesses talk about Pride and LGBT+ support in a modern, stylish language, without clichés and banalities, and also allows companies to unite in joint communication. All our joint posts were prepared in this style. You can read the recommendations at the link. A text brandbook that provides ready-made step-by-step recommendations on how to write about LGBT+ people respectfully and correctly, avoiding stereotypes and offensive formulations, as well as demonstrating end-to-end support. This is not just a set of tips, but a kind of tone map that allows businesses to join the conversation confidently and without fear of making a mistake. You can read the recommendations at the link. A general map of friendly businesses in Ukraine, where those who have already openly declared today: “We are with you” are gathered. This map is more than a list of addresses of bookstores or other stores. It is a network of safe spaces that form a new geography of solidarity. You can view friendly businesses nearby at the link. Thus, “We were. We are. We will be” became a project that went beyond Pride Month. It gave people the feeling that change is possible, that even a few brave businesses can launch a public discussion. We are not stopping there: the brandbook, texts and map remain tools that will continue to work and are available for constant use in the coming years, because Pride is not a date on the calendar, but a value that we embody every day.
The project “We were. We are. We will be” was created as part of the Human Rights Academy 2.0 project by Gender Stream with the support of the Center For Disaster Philanthropy. The content does not necessarily reflect the views of these organizations.
Myth one: the waters have broken, labor will begin now
The breaking of the waters is the first sign that “it has begun.” This was the case with Rachel Green and Phoebe Buffay — the characters who formed the supporting structures of my teenage identity.
But in reality, which is supposedly depicted in mass culture, the waters do break in the first stage of labor, which lasts (in primiparous women) up to eighteen hours. Oops! Sometime during this period it will happen. Or not. Or a week passes between the breaking of the waters and the delivery — this also happens, although not often. Just as infrequently as the epic breaking of the waters popular in the movies.
For most women, labor begins with (drum roll) the realization that labor has begun. The woman feels contractions, and she needs to understand whether these are another training or “combat” contractions.
And contractions don’t look epic in the movie: my friends, my pregnancy podcast listeners, and I, while going through contractions, walked in parks, picked up packages from the post office, or routinely conducted live broadcasts. And you know what we didn’t do? We didn’t grab our bellies, bending over sharply and shouting: “I’m giving birth! Help! Hurry up!” The beginning of labor is mostly boring.
Myth Two: Childbirth is a quick process
The influence of movies and TV shows on my expectations of my own childbirth was so strong that I knew for sure: ten minutes would pass between the start of contractions and “I see the head,” just like in the movies. Scientific information and the chorus of doctors didn’t sound as convincing as scenes from my favorite TV shows. Danielle from “Desperate Housewives” barely had time to get home from the house next door before she heard the cry of a newborn. Am I worse?
After three hours of painless contractions, I banged on the door of the maternity ward as defiantly as if they were illegally holding the baby inside me. But the truth is that both the medical records and the statistics were true. Childbirth for most people is not only boring, but also long.
Here’s a story about war-life balance and birth timing. My friends are preparing for a twin birth. She’s in Kyiv, and he’s in the Ukrainian Armed Forces 400 kilometers away. When she realizes that labor has begun, he has to come to the hospital immediately. This plan is realistic, because 400 kilometers is five hours of travel. Most first births don’t fit into this timing.
This, of course, breaks a lot of scenarios. From the latest, “Train on December 31”, where a pregnant woman during an eight-hour journey from Kyiv to Lviv manages not only to spend time without any signs of labor activity, but also to give birth and rest after giving birth in a dining car.
Myth three: giving birth is lying on her back and following the doctor’s commands
This is how childbirth is in the movie “Annette”.
The “gold standard” of mass-culture childbirth is lying on her back and screaming. Some, like Rachel Green or the pregnant woman from the movie “Train on December 31”, lie down even during contractions and attempts. There is much more harm in this stereotype than it might seem at first glance.
At least because this position is the most painful for a woman. And so, when you give birth, it can be more painful and less painful. To do this, you need to move and find what is best for you at each stage. This is not my opinion – this is the advice of modern medical protocols. And my practice.
For millennia, women gave birth in positions that were most comfortable for them. This began to change in the 18th century, when births began to take place in hospitals, and male doctors gradually replaced traditional midwives. Women were not allowed to attend medical schools. It was believed that a man without a penis could not understand childbirth. Of course, where would he get one!
Men declared themselves the main ones in matters of birth: medical interventions (such as the use of forceps) became a priority, and the natural course of childbirth was often ignored.
A woman was transformed into an object from which doctors extracted a child. These are unexpected “achievements” that, among other things, were brought to us by the development of medicine. It was only in the 20th century that women began to receive medical education, and with it the right to subjectivity in their own childbirth.
Modern medicine advises doctors to encourage women to move during labor. We could learn this from movies, but the male cult is still guided by the 18th century standard: a confused and frightened woman on her shoulder blades and a hero-savior who “gives birth” to her.
That’s exactly what happened in “The Train on December 31,” where the woman in labor was placed on her shoulder blades on the table of a dining car. Imagine yourself on your back on a table in a dining car with your legs spread. Comfortable? Now add the movement of the train and the effort. Incredible, right?
The only thing worse is that the woman is heroically saved by a man who calls three other men. Of course, no one asks women who have children about childbirth.
Continuing the thought experiment, I will assume that childbirth on a train could go like this: the girl would stay in her compartment, a person would come there to help her, and the woman in labor would hardly climb onto the table if there was a bed.
Why is it important to show the subjectivity of a woman during childbirth And not just intimidate with fear and pain, from which women are heroically saved.
Let’s start from the opposite: for what purpose should we intimidate women? To show how a person instantly loses all control, hoping that someone will tell her how to save herself. For what? Fear is adrenaline, it slows down labor activity. Isn’t it better when a woman, crossing the threshold of the hospital, is not intimidated, does not expect horror, but has the opportunity to think: should/can I be comfortable during childbirth? How? Do I have the right to move, drink, eat (labor can last 20 hours, after all)? Whose needs during childbirth are the main ones – mine or the doctors’?
The answer to the last question is key: if the main ones are the doctors (or those who take the birth), then I may have to obey them, even if they commit violence against me (shout, interfere with the birth without my conscious consent, press on my stomach, forbid me to move, determine the way in which the birth will take place against my will). This is all obstetric violence, a violation of the rights of the woman in labor, unacceptable behavior of medical personnel. And it is also important to know about this “beforehand”.
I believe and know that the woman is the main one in childbirth, because, after all, she is the only person without whom the birth will not take place. Everyone else is present only to facilitate her experience, support, help. And save in those rare situations when it is really necessary.
Such childbirth, by the way, is also shown in TV series.
For example, This Is Us. Due to force majeure, the heroine Beth gives birth at home. She finds a comfortable position (miraculously, not on her back on the dining table, unlike Piper Halliwell, for example). And no one heroically saves her, she is supported by another woman and her husband.
What to do. Consulting for the film industry and beyond Mascult must recognize its influence on the formation of women’s ideas about childbirth and stop exploiting emergency births and outdated practices. This will allow us to understand that the stereotypes about a helpless woman who needs rescuers-doctors only reinforce the culture of fear and increase the tolerance of obstetric violence.
Screenwriters and directors should research the topic before writing and filming childbirth scenes. There are consultants in forensics, medicine, and martial arts in cinema, so why is childbirth still “drawn” from a TV series template? Take advice from midwives, doctors, doulas, watch documentaries about the medicalization of childbirth, and ask ChatGPT which stereotypes about childbirth are not true.
Viewers also have a voice. We can share our own childbirth stories. It seems like a drop in the ocean, but each story can become a brick from which another woman can build her confidence. We can comment on and analyze childbirth scenes in films and TV series, ask why the heroine is screaming in pain and is not offered pain relief, why doctors act as if she has no voice. Demand creates supply.
Mascult doesn’t just reproduce reality — it constructs it. So if we don’t want to see intimidated women ready for violence in maternity wards, then maybe we should show more than just the horrors of childbirth? Fear blocks childbirth. But it helps restore a sense of security, one’s own strength, and peace. Good words to describe childbirth, dear creators of mass content.
Загальнонаціональна хвилина мовчання
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